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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization 
policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It uses updated data to appraise second 
generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated policy 
implications. The ‘freedom to trade’ and ‘economic freedom’ indices are also employed. The 
following findings are established. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates financial allocation 
efficiency, with the magnitude of the de jure indicator (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de 
facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports significantly improve financial efficiency. (3) 
Institutional liberalization has a positive effect on the efficiency of allocation while the effect 
of political liberalization is not significant. (4) Freedom of trade decreases (improves) 
financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic freedom facilitates the transformation of 
mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators. Justifications for 
these nexuses are provided.    
JEL Classification: D6; F30; F41; F50; O55 
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1. Introduction  
The recent financial crisis has brought renewed interest in the fierce debate about the 
lofty goals of liberalization policies and their implications for financial development, 
especially in developing countries. Some analysts are of the stance that the global financial 
crisis has dramatically unraveled the downsides of politico-economic globalization, as many 
emerging markets and developing economies (which had to grapple with surges in capital 
flows earlier in the last decade) are now experiencing a sharp reversal of those inflows due to 
the crisis (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012a). Financial mechanisms that have eased the 
economic downturn have resurfaced concerns about the appealing ambitions of financial 
globalization and their implications for growth and volatility, with particular emphasis on 
developing countries. The premise for this strand of fears is that, according to theoretical 
postulation the benefits of financial liberalization are expected to the higher in developing 
countries
1
.  
The current wind of politico-economic globalization began in the 1980s with soaring 
cross border financial flows among industrial economies as well as among developing 
countries. This was eased by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these countries 
since it was widely anticipated that increased cross-border flows would bring higher appeals 
in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international risk-sharing. 
Many economic policy makers have been of the view that, these benefits ought to be high for 
developing countries that have more volatile income growth and tend to be relatively capital-
poor (Kose et al., 2006). With the surge in financial inflows, came a spade of currency and 
financial turmoils in the late 1980s and 1990s. This pattern set the course for many scholars to 
                                                 
1
 From a theoretical standpoint, financial globalization should ease the efficient international allocation of capital 
and promote international risk sharing. These benefits should be much higher for developing countries because 
they are relatively capital scarce and labor rich. Hence, access to foreign capital should help them increase 
investment and growth (Asongu, 2012a). Moreover, developing countries have more volatile output than 
advanced industrial countries which increases their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing (Kose 
et al., 2011).  
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begin advocating that developing countries which opened-up their capital accounts have been 
more vulnerable to crises (and consequently more adversely affected) than their industrial 
counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; Asongu, 2012a). These developments have 
ignited a fierce and heated debate among academics and practitioners of liberalization 
policies. While the debate over the positive gains from trade liberalization has tilted towards a 
consensus (Kose et al., 2006), that on other liberalization policies (especially capital account 
openness) has intensified and become more polarized (Asongu, 2012a). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a chain of structural and 
policy adjustments at financial, economic and political levels with the goal of given impetus 
to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and financial efficiency (Janine & 
Elbadawi, 1992). In the first generational reforms, adopted policies included: reducing direct 
government intervention in bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing 
and allocation of credit, relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing 
of interests rates to be market determined. Second generational reforms targeted structural and 
institutional constraints, notably: improvement of the legal, regulatory, supervisory and 
institutional environments, restoring of bank soundness and, rehabilitation of financial 
infrastructure (Batuo et al., 2010). Unfortunately, despite over two decades of financial 
reforms, African economies have not made significant strides in tackling the substantially 
documented excess liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006; Founda, 2009; Asongu, 2012b). 
Accordingly, the weight of this empirical evidence on surplus liquidity adequately justifies the 
temptation of questioning the financial allocation efficiency gains of the reforms. While a 
substantial bulk of the literature has examined the impact of financial reforms on financial 
development (Cho et al., 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010), but for Asongu 
(2012b), the financial efficiency dimension has not been tackled from a fundamental 
allocation efficiency standpoint (Ataullah et al., 2004; Saxegaard, 2006; Al-Obaidan, 2008; 
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Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010). Perhaps the main hurdle in investigating the linkage between 
liberalization of financial markets and capital allocation efficiency lies in the fact that, the 
efficiency of capital allocation is not directly observable (Kukenova, 2011, p.1). 
 In light of the above, the present study steers clear of past works from four 
standpoints: the conception and definition of efficiency, the focus on Africa, employment of a 
plethora of liberalization policy variables and, the use of updated data. Firstly, contrary to 
authors that have conceived financial allocation efficiency from three mainstream 
perspectives (the efficiency of decision making units through Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA)
2
, Overall Economic Efficiency (OEE) with respect to the product of technical and 
scale efficiencies
3
 or  cost and profitability orientated views)
4
,  the concept adopted in the 
current work reflects how financial intermediaries (banks) fulfill their fundamental role of 
transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. In so doing, the issue of 
surplus liquidity is rightly calibrated. Secondly, we are focusing on a continent that is 
suffering from the paradox of ‘excess bank liquidity and dire investment needs’. Thirdly, by 
employing a plethora of liberalization policies (financial, trade, institutional, political ...etc.), 
we present a broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses between liberalization policies and 
financial efficiency. Lastly, the use of much recent data provides findings with more focused 
and updated policy implications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly provides an insight into 
the debate. Measurement issues and estimation strategy are discussed and outlined 
                                                 
2
 Refer inter alia to Ataullah et al. (2004) who have used DEA to investigate the technical and scale efficiencies 
of financial intermediaries in India and Pakistan.  
3
 For example see Al-Obaidan (2008) who has used a composite indicator for the efficiency of the banking 
industry in the Gulf region to show (with deterministic and stochastic analyses) that openness enhances technical 
efficiency. 
4
 Refer to the African financial efficiency literature (Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010). From a broader perspective, 
four main indicators of this stance on efficiency are discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt & Beck (2009). They include: 
the ratio of bank deposits (which measures the extent to which savings can fund private credit), the net interest 
margin (which is the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenues as a share of its total assets), overhead 
cost (or the accounting value of the bank’s overhead cost as a share of its total assets) and, cost/income ratio 
(which assesses overhead costs relative to revenues). While the last three are profitability oriented, our 
conception of efficiency is captured by the first (Asongu, 2012b).  
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respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and corresponding discussion are covered in 
Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Brief insights into the debate on financial allocation efficiency  
 The decision on whether to embrace liberalization policies as means of facilitating the 
efficient allocation of financial resources and reaping the benefits of international risk sharing 
is not without controversy.  From a broad standpoint, there are two different narratives on the 
wisdom of liberalization as a policy choice for developing countries in their attempt to 
improve allocation efficiency.  
 The first strand that supports the benefits of ‘allocation efficiency’ substantially relies 
on the seminal work of Solow (1956) on the predictions of standard neoclassical growth. In 
this neoclassical model, liberalization policies (especially capital account openness) facilitate 
a more efficient allocation of resources and produce all kinds of appealing effects. Consistent 
with this strand, resources flow from capital abundant developed countries (where the return 
for capital is low) to capital-scarce developing countries (where the return of capital is high). 
The trickle of resources to developing countries reduces their cost of capital, triggering a 
temporal improvement in investment and growth that raise living standards permanently 
(Obstfeld, 1998; Fischer, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000; Asongu, 2012a). Partly 
motivated by the potential gains from incorporating ‘allocating efficiency’ arguments into 
their economic policies, many developing countries from Santiago to Seoul have implemented 
some form of liberalization during the past quarter century (Asongu, 2012a).  
 In the second strand, ‘allocation efficiency’ is conceived, viewed and depicted as a 
fanciful attempt to extend to the results of the gains from international trade in goods to 
international trade in assets. The predictions of ‘allocation efficiency’ have meaning (if any), 
only and only if the economy suffers from no distortions other than the free flow of capital. 
Therefore, owing to the distortions witnessed in developing countries, the antithesis argues 
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that the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical model bear little resemblance to the reality 
of liberalization policies. For example, from a financial liberalization standpoint, provocative 
titles like, “Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility? (before the turn of the century) and 
“Why did financial globalization disappoint?”  (a decade after) by Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik 
& Subramanian (2009) respectively, best characterize this antithesis. There appears to be no 
apparent correlation between the openness of countries’ capital accounts and the amount they 
invest or the rate at which they grow. According to this stance, the benefits of open capital 
account (if at all they exist) are not really apparent, but the costs are manifestly evident 
through recurrent emerging-market crises (Rodrik, 1998). At the dawn of the sub-prime 
financial crisis, the claims that recent financial engineering has generated large gains sounded 
less plausible and it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic financial markets will be 
more scrutinized (Sodrik & Subramanian, 2009). With regard to this narrative, even leaving 
financial crises aside, on the international front it is increasingly crystal-clear that the benefits 
of financial liberalization have been hard to find
5
. This narrative further argues that; financial 
globalization has not generated increased investment or higher growth in developing 
countries. Accordingly, economies that have progressed most rapidly have been those that 
have relied less on capital inflows. Hence, globalization policies have felt short of smoothing 
consumption and/or reducing volatility. According to this strand, the evidence based on the 
phenomenon today is indirect, speculative and ultimately unpersuasive (Asongu, 2012a). This 
antithesis has concluded with the recommendation that, it is time for a new paradigm on 
liberalization policies that recognizes that more is not necessarily better.  
 
                                                 
5
 This stance is still object of a heated debate. Whereas, Leung (2003) has concluded that, increase in external 
debts flows in least developed countries is worsening business cycles,  Kholdy & Sohrabian (2008) have 
established that, foreign investment  may jump-start financial development in developing countries; especially in 
countries  which experience a higher level of corruption in the forms of excessive patronage, job reservations, 
nepotism, “favor-for-favors”, secret party funding and, suspiciously close links between politics and business. 
From an industrial standpoint, in some developing countries, liberalization has not been found to exert a 
significant impact on efficiency and productivity (Mulwa et al., 2009).  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We assess a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), Chinn & Ito (2002), Gwartney et al. 
(2011) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) for the period 1996 to 
2010. Limitations to the number of countries and periodicity of analysis have a twofold 
justification: (1) constraints in data availability on institutional quality and; (2) the motivation 
of capturing the effects of second generational financial reforms (that targeted institutional 
and structural constraints) for more updated and focused policy implications. 
Consistent with Asongu (2012b), the dependent variable measuring financial 
allocation efficiency seeks to capture how mobilized deposits are transformed into credit for 
economic operators; hence, it addresses the concern of excess liquidity.  In quest for 
robustness, we employ two indicators: banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-
efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’).  
 In this study, we distinguish among five types of liberalization policies: financial, 
trade, institutional, political and other liberalizations. (1) Financial liberalization is measured 
by: de jure capital account openness (KAPOPEN), developed by Chinn & Ito (2002); and de 
facto capital account openness (foreign direct investment: FDI). KAOPEN is the first 
principal component of four binary variables in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and it takes higher values for more 
open financial regimes. We are poised to add subtlety to the analysis by complementing 
KAOPEN with FDI because: the former may not capture the actual ebb and flow of cross 
border capital and its impact (Aizenman et al., 2009); the private sector often circumvents 
capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls 
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(Edwards, 1999) and; more recently, China’s de facto openness, despite its de jure closeness 
has been subject to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 
2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009). (2) Trade liberalization is measured by trade openness and 
exports. While the former is the sum of imports and exports of commodities as a % of GDP, 
the latter only consists of commodity exports on GDP. (3) Institutional liberalization is the 
first principal component of six good governance indicators: corruption-control, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality, political stability and voice & accountability. (4) 
Political liberalization is appreciated by the Democracy index. (5) Other liberalization 
measures include: ‘freedom to trade’ and economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2011).  
‘Freedom to trade internationally’ is an index representing: taxes on international trade 
(international trade tax revenues as % of trade sector; mean tariff rate and standard deviation 
of tariff rates); regulatory trade barriers (non tariff trade barriers and compliance cost of 
exporting and importing); size of trade sector relative to expected; black market exchange 
rates and international market capital controls (‘foreign ownership /investment’ restrictions 
and capital controls). Economic freedom broadly represents: freedom to trade internationally; 
legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; size of government 
(expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; regulation of credit, labor and business.  
Control variables include: inflation, government expenditure, economic prosperity 
(GDP growth), human development, foreign aid and population growth. Consistent with 
recent African finance literature, we expect inflation to decrease financial efficiency (Asongu, 
2011a; Asongu, 2012c) while economic prosperity and population growth should improve it 
(Asongu, 2011a). Human development should also improve efficiency whereas the effects of 
government expenditure and development assistance are contingent on the quality of 
institutions. Accordingly, government expenditure and development assistance destined for 
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the improvement of the financial sector that is not tainted with corrupt practices will improve 
efficiency.   
Details about the summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation 
analysis (showing the nexuses among key variables used in the paper), and variable 
definitions are presented in the appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ (Appendix 1) of the 
variables used in the panel regressions reveals that, there is quite some variation in the data 
utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated linkages should emerge. 
The object of the correlation matrix (Appendix 3) is to mitigate issues resulting from 
overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation 
coefficients, there do not appear to be any disturbing issues in terms of the relationships to be 
estimated.  Appendix 2 reveals definitions and corresponding sources of the variables. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Due to the high correlation among various good governance indicators, one might 
criticize the redundancy of some information. Hence, we use principal component analysis 
(PCA) to reduce the dimensions of government-effectiveness, rule of law, corruption-control, 
regulation quality, voice & accountability and political stability. PCA is a widely used 
statistical technique applied to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of 
uncorrelated variables called principal components (PC) that account for most of the 
information in the original data set. In the selection of the PCs, the criteria applied to 
determine how many common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe 
(2002). Therefore, only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. As shown in 
Table 1, the first PC is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and represents more 
than 78% of information in the institutional indicators combined. The first PC will 
subsequently represent the institutional liberalization index (Instidex). 
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Institutional Index (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C 0.369 0.435 0.412 0.425 0.388 0.416 0.784 0.784 4.705 
Second  P.C -0.690 0.103 0.258 0.436 -0.453 0.227 0.083 0.867 0.499 
Third P.C -0.591 0.187 -0.299 -0.051 0.724 0.002 0.054 0.922 0.327 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. G.E: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
When compared with cross-country analysis, estimation with dynamic panel data has 
some important upsides and one downside (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008). On the positive 
side: (1) it makes use of both time-series and the cross sectional variations in the data; (2) in 
cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, so 
that correlations between the error term and the exogenous variables results in biased 
estimated coefficients. More so, in cross-country regressions, if the lagged dependent variable 
is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific effect is certainly correlated 
with the regressors. A measure of controlling for the presence of the unobserved country-
specific effect is to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate the country-specific 
effect and, then make use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. Addressing the 
endogeneity concern is the second positive side of dynamic panel data analysis. Uncontrolled 
endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and, lead to misleading inferences and unhealthy 
policy recommendations. Dynamic panel data analysis addresses this endogeneity issue by 
using lagged values of exogenous variables as instruments.  
 The principal downside linked with dynamic panel data analysis is using data-averages 
over shorter time spans. Consequently, the estimated results reveal short-run impacts and not 
long-term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing results. The 
redeeming feature however is that, the use of average data mitigates short-run disturbances 
that may loom substantially large.   
 The dynamic panel regression model is expressed as follows: 
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tititiytititititititi WOPITFFEFE ,,,6,5,4,3,21,10,           (1)             
 Where ‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. FE is financial efficiency; 
F , financial liberalization (KAOPEN and FDI); T , trade liberalization (trade and exports); 
I , institutional liberalization (Instidex); P , political liberalization (democracy); O , other 
liberalizations (economic freedom and freedom to trade).  tiW ,  is a vector of control variables 
(inflation, government expenditure, human development, economic prosperity, foreign aid 
and population growth)
6
 with 136  y  ,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time-
specific constant and  ti ,  an error term.  
 Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the explaining variables above are strictly 
exogenous. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because: (1) while they have a 
substantial incidence on financial efficiency, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out because 
the efficiency in allocation of financial resource in an economy also has some bearing on the 
plethora of regressors; (2)  the regressors could be correlated with the error term ( ti , ) and; (3) 
country- and time-specific effects could also be correlated with other variables in the model, 
which is often the case with lagged dependent variables included in the equations.  Hence, an 
issue of endogeneity emerges as a result of endogenous regressors.  A way of dealing with the 
problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent 
variables involves eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. Therefore Eq. (1) 
becomes: 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi IITTFFFEFEFEFE 
  
 
                   )()()()()( 1,,11,,1,,61,,5   tititttitiytitititi WWOOPP        (2) 
              
                                                 
6
 We have already discussed the expected signs of control variables in the Data section.  
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However Eq. (2) presents another concern; estimation by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is still bias because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous 
independent variable and the error term. In order to tackle this new concern, we estimate the 
regression in differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation. The technique uses lagged levels of the regressors as 
instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments 
in the level equation, hence, exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
dependent variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 
1998), we go for the latter with respect to Bond et al. (2001, 3-4)
7
.  
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we opt for the two-step GMM 
because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the one-step, the residuals are 
considered to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
relevant as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variables. 
Moreover, the estimation depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the 
error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation: AR(2) 
should not be. The validity of the instruments is investigated with the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM 
estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases 
                                                 
7
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al.  (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity 
of all regressors (Asongu, 2012d). 
 
 
Table 2: Two-step System GMM for financial allocation efficiency  
  Dependent variable: Financial Efficiency(E)   
  Two Year Non Overlapping Intervals  Three Year Non Overlapping Intervals  
  Banking System E  Financial System E  Banking System E Financial System E  
constant -0.437* -0.373 0.081 0.336** 1.06*** 0.633* 0.035 -0.657 
 (-1.781) (-1.092) (0.542) (2.186) (6.691) (1.665) (0.153) (-1.168) 
Finance_1 0.685*** 0.667*** 1.147*** 0.401* -0.296 -0.160 0.840*** 0.760*** 
 (3.578) (3.887) (9.205) (1.715) (-1.450) (-0.336) (3.544) (4.257) 
 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen -0.048** -0.047** 0.030 -0.038** -0.082*** -0.09** -0.006 -0.051** 
 (-2.344) (-2.338) (1.349) (-2.398) (-3.900) (-2.244) (-0.224) (-1.996) 
FDI -0.006 --- --- -0.007** -0.012** -0.010 -0.004 0.0009 
 (-1.006)   (-2.256) (-2.280) (-1.458) (-0.831) (0.106) 
 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  -0.0004 --- 0.0009 --- -0.000 --- 0.0002  
 (-0.629)  (0.985)  (-0.013)  (0.252)  
Exports --- --- --- 0.002* --- 0.000 --- -0.001 
    (1.946)  (0.016)  (-0.867) 
 
Institutional 
Liberalization 
Instidex --- -0.010 -0.012 --- 0.052** 0.081* 0.007 0.002 
  (-0.767) (-0.763)  (2.201) (1.784) (0.579) (0.330) 
Demo --- 0.002 0.007 --- --- -0.015 --- --- 
  (0.416) (1.418)   (-1.146)   
          
Freedom of Trade  --- --- -0.062** --- --- 0.055** --- --- 
   (-2.131)   (2.083)   
Economic Freedom  0.119*** 0.110** --- --- --- --- --- 0.140** 
 (3.645) (2.046)      (1.985) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.001 -0.013*** -0.007* -0.006* -0.003 
 (-0.763) (-1.263) (0.134) (-0.861) (-3.875) (-1.745) (-1.658) (-0.654) 
Government Expenditure  -0.0005 -0.002 0.0002 0.0005 -0.002** -0.001 0.002** 0.001 
 (-0.245) (-0.889) (0.113) (0.517) (-2.024) (-0.501) (2.047) (0.880) 
Human Development  --- 0.001 --- 0.007** --- --- 0.005 0.005 
  (0.948)  (2.084)   (0.754) (0.702) 
Economic Prosperity  0.007* 0.002 --- 0.007*** --- --- 0.020* --- 
 (1.886) (0.513)  (3.648)   (1.858)  
Foreign Aid --- 0.0008 --- -0.012** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.209)  (-2.814)     
Population Growth Rate -0.025 -0.026 0.050 0.044** --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.676) (-1.277) (1.194) (2.121)     
         
Test for AR(2) errors 0.026 -1.031 -0.832 -0.120 -0.699 -0.644 -2.055** -1.702* 
 [0.979] [0.3021] [0.405] [0.903 ] [0.484] [0.519 ] [0.039] [0.088 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  13.515 8.555 12.595 7.174 4.245 6.243 11.032 7.642  
 [0.969 ] [0.999] [0.981] [0.999 ] [0.834] [0.620] [0.199 ] [0.469 ] 
Wald(joint) test 457.3*** 40047*** 1555*** 1479*** 93.48*** 175.8*** 9883*** 40586*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Number of Instruments  35 37 35 37 16 18 18 18 
Number of Countries  19 18 20 19 19 18 17 16 
Number of Observations  92 84 98 103 68 62 58 53 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 Based on the results presented in Table 2 above, the following conclusions could be 
drawn. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates financial efficiency, with the effect of the de jure 
indicator (KAOPEN) higher than that of the de facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports 
significantly improve financial efficiency. (3) Institutional liberalization has a positive effect 
on the efficiency of allocation while the effect of political liberalization is not significant. (4) 
Freedom of trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic 
freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit 
for economic operators. (6) Most of the control variables are significant with expected signs. 
Inflation decreases efficiency (Asongu, 2011a; Asongu, 2012c) while economic prosperity 
(Asongu, 2011a) and population growth increase it.  
 
4.2 Discussion of results  
 We now devote space to discussing the results. Firstly, we have found that financial 
liberalization is not pro-financial efficiency with the magnitude of KAOPEN higher than that 
of FDI. The two financial liberalization measures differ principally from the view that, 
KAOPEN measures de jure capital openness by accounting for regulatory restrictions on 
capital account transactions, while FDI is capital account openness. Hence, KAOPEN tends to 
increase as capital markets are more liberalized; so with FDI, KAOPEN increases. The greater 
detrimental effect of KAOPEN confirms China’s capital account opening strategy. In fact, 
very recently, China’s de facto openness despite its de jure closeness has been subject to 
much discussion in research and policy making circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & 
Glick, 2009; Shah  & Patnaik, 2009).   
Secondly, the fact that exports improve efficiency is logical in the perspective that, 
despite the surplus liquidity issues witnessed by African financial institutions, credit would 
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easily be granted for export-oriented activities because it is a direct source of income with less 
credit risk. Indeed there is a wide consensus on this positive effect of trade (Kose et al., 2006).  
Thirdly, the fact that institutional liberalization is pro-efficiency while the political 
liberalization effect is insignificant is also logical. Institutional adjustments (corruption-
control, government effectiveness, political stability, voice & accountability, rule of law and 
regulation quality) were part of second generational reforms that aimed to improve economic 
and financial efficiency. Conversely, the effect of democracy cannot be too apparent because 
elections are multi-annual; hence, it is not directly linked to financial development. Another 
explanation that is consistent with recent finance-democracy literature is the time and level 
hypothetical benefits of democracy in financial development (Asongu, 2011b). According to 
Asongu, democracy in Africa has important effects on the degree of competition for public 
offices but less significant effects in comparison with autocracy on policies of financial 
development because, democracies in the continent are young (time hypothesis) and weak 
(level hypothesis).  
Fourthly, the fact that freedom to trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) 
system efficiency means that traders operating with semi-formal and informal financial 
institutions have less access to credit facilities for their activities.  
Fifthly, the fact that economic freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized 
financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators, could be due to the 
substantial weight of its legal structure component (see definition in Section 3.1 and 
correlation with Instidex in Appendix 3): which is undoubtedly positively associated with the 
institutional impact already covered above. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated how financial, trade, institutional and political 
liberalization policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It has used updated data to 
appraise second generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated 
policy implications. The ‘freedom to trade’ and ‘economic freedom’ indices are also 
employed. The following findings are established. (1) Financial liberalization mitigates 
financial allocation efficiency, with the magnitude of the de jure indicator (KAOPEN) higher 
than that of the de facto measurement (FDI). (2) Exports significantly improve financial 
efficiency. (3) Institutional liberalization has a positive effect on the efficiency of allocation 
while the effect of political liberalization is not significant. (4) Freedom of trade decreases 
(improves) financial (banking) system efficiency. (5) Economic freedom facilitates the 
transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators. 
Justifications for these nexuses are provided.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
       
Financial 
Efficiency  
Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) 0.786 0.352 0.206 2.249 379 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 0.848 0.462 0.214 2.587 363 
       
Financial 
Liberalization 
KAOPEN  -0.505 1.278 -1.843 2.477 392 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Trade 
Liberalization 
Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Exports  30.245 14.618 5.820 69.032 401 
       
Institutional & 
Political 
Liberalizations 
Institutional Index 0.088 2.152 -4.569 5.233 320 
Democracy   3.263 3.959 -8.000 10.000 224 
       
Other 
Liberalizations  
Freedom to Trade  6.060 0.917 3.400 8.100 250 
Economic Freedom   6.118 0.632 4.710 7.820 250 
       
 
 
Control Variables  
 
 
Inflation 7.239 9.496 -100.00 46.561 395 
Government Expenditure 4.304 10.670 -34.882 61.364 298 
Human Development 1.913 8.0128 0.204 47.486 341 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Foreign Aid 9.447 8.946 -0.251 54.785 392 
Population growth  2.275 0.741 0.042 4.146 420 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic. 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
 
Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Dependent Variables 
    
Banking System Efficiency  BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Financial System Efficiency  FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Independent Variables  
    
Financial Liberalization 1 KAOPEN De Jure Capital Openness Chinn & Ito (2002) 
    
Financial Liberalization 2 FDI  Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 1  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 2  Export Exports of Good & Services (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Institutional Liberalisation1 Instidex 1st Principal Component of: RL; RQ; CC;V&A; PS; GE P.C Analysis  
    
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized Democracy(Estimate) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Freedom  TFree Freedom of Trade Index  Gwartney et al. (2011). 
Economic Freedom 
Dataset 
   
Economic Freedom  EcoFree Economic Freedom Index  
   
Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (Annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Expenditure GE Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Foreign-Aid  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. V& A: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government 
Effectiveness.  
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   Appendix 3: Correlation analysis 
Dependent Vbles Economic liberalization Independent Variables Control Variables  
Fin. Efficiency Fin. Lib. Trade Lib. Inst & Pol. Lib Other Libs        
BcBd FcFd KAOPEN FDI Trade Exports Instidex Demo TFree EFree Infl GE IHDI GDPg NODA Popg  
1.000 0.830 -0.209 -0.19 0.008 0.110 0.100 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.172 0.03 0.04 -0.17 -0.169 -0.12 BcBd 
 1.000 -0.267 -0.19 -0.07 0.032 0.190 0.059 -0.16 0.023 -0.215 -0.00 0.35 -0.19 -0.195 -0.18 FcFd 
  1.000 0.058 0.050 0.110 0.300 0.188 0.542 0.692 0.117 0.04 -0.11 0.091 -0.206 -0.11 KAOPEN 
   1.000 0.470 0.107 0.094 0.010 0.331 0.306 -0.302 0.07 -0.03 0.095 -0.015 -0.15 FDI 
    1.000 0.840 0.472 0.193 0.451 0.344 -0.110 0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25 -0.42 Trade 
     1.000 0.507 0.154 0.464 0.380 -0.019 0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.48 -0.43 Exports 
      1.000 0.542 0.574 0.680 -0.009 -0.00 0.13 0.146 -0.409 -0.34 Instidex 
       1.000 0.324 0.381 0.152 0.01 0.11 0.125 -0.016 -0.08 Demo 
        1.000 0.770 0.230 0.01 0.08 0.097 -0.429 -0.19 TFree 
         1.000 0.084 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.021 -0.37 EFree 
          1.000 -0.17 0.04 0.021 0.178 0.09 Infl 
           1.00 -0.22 0.214 0.040 0.02 GE 
            1.00 -0.05 -0.095 0.01 IHDI 
             1.000 0.158 0.23 GDPg 
              1.000 0.50 NODA 
               1.00 Popg 
                 
 BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial System Efficiency). KAOPEN: De Jure measure of Capital Openness. FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. Instidex: Institutional Liberalization  Index. Demo:   Democracy. TFree: Freedom   to Trade. EFree: Economic Freedom. Infl: Inflation. GE: Government Expenditure. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human 
Development Index. GDPg: GDP growth rate. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  Popg: Population growth rate.  Inst. & Pol: Institutional and Political. Vbles: Variables.  
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